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“THE FACE IS THE ROAD MAP”

*Vietnamese Amerasians in U.S. Political and
Popular Culture, 1980–1988*

jana k. lipman

In the spring of 1980, TV journalist Bill Kurtis returned to Saigon for a retrospective of the city five years after the North Vietnamese army's victory. As he researched a story about the ongoing effects of Agent Orange, Kurtis became entranced by the dozens of Amerasians he encountered on the streets. Kurtis saw Vietnamese Amerasians, the children of Vietnamese mothers and American fathers, in the streets, markets, and parks, and they, in turn, fixed themselves to Kurtis in hopes that he could courier letters and advocate for their right to enter the United States. Publishing a feature in the *New York Times Magazine*, Kurtis described his ongoing amazement at seeing “America” in the streets of Saigon: “The children on the street were wrestling over an orange, their shrill voices chattering wildly when a young face peered from the middle of the group. It was haunting in its clarity, and quite distinct from the faces of the Vietnamese youngsters around it. There was no mistaking it; there was an American face.”¹

A photo essay accompanied the article. One photo highlighted a Vietnamese woman holding her young Amerasian child up against her, and another group photo again presented Vietnamese women with their Amerasian children and adolescents. The reader was supposed to recognize the “American” traits in their faces, and all but one of the Amerasians photographed ostensibly had white, and by implication, American fathers. Amerasians with African American fathers were not featured prominently in the article or photo essay. The racial logic at work was clear; whiteness defined Vietnamese Amerasians’ American ties.

One image disrupted this otherwise unquestioned coupling of American identity with white racial markers. The feature included a picture of a child with the following caption: "This Vietnamese girl's wartime father was a Hawaiian American." The photograph of this reportedly Vietnamese-Hawaiian child quietly upset the racial assumptions in the article and its equation of an "American face" with presumably legible white or black parentage. It was the lone image I found in the popular press of a Vietnamese Amerasian with claims to America based on Asian American or Pacific Island paternity.² The photograph stands out for its singularity and its disruptive power. There was no commentary on how one could "see" this young girl's Hawaiian heritage in the text. Kurtis did not question the United States' claim on Hawaii or the much longer history of U.S. militarism in Asia and the Pacific.

During the 1980s, U.S. journalists and politicians mapped a discourse of national redemption onto Vietnamese Amerasians; however, the resulting policies and media images reinscribed hierarchies of race and sexuality grounded in the history of Asian exclusion. I draw on congressional testimony, executive branch papers, mass media, and popular periodicals to analyze the racial, gendered, and imperial assumptions written into Amerasian immigration policy.³ This essay makes a two-part argument. First, Amerasians' growing visibility coincided with the influx of hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese refugees, renewed anti-Asian xenophobia and violence, the passage of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), and ongoing diplomatic hostility with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. In this moment, U.S. politicians and the media presented Amerasians as biological Americans who could be brought home, rather than as immigrants or foreigners. As such, Amerasian policies became intertwined in broader debates over immigration and American prisoners of war (POWs) in Vietnam. Second, congressional and administrative officials wrote gendered and racial assumptions into the law, and journalists, in turn, made race hypervisible in their reporting on Amerasians. Racial markers defined popular representation of Vietnamese Amerasians. It was the round eyes and curly hair or the blond hair and freckles, and sometimes even the kinky hair, that delineated these young people as American.⁴ Moreover, U.S. politicians and journalists imagined a nation



These two photographs were part of Bill Kurtis' article and photo essay on Vietnamese Amerasians in the *New York Times Magazine* on March 2, 1980.
Photographs by Bill Kurtis

with anti-Communist American fathers at-the-ready. In reality, Vietnamese Amerasians often had to choose between the United States and their Vietnamese mothers. Even when this harsh calculus changed, a reunified nuclear family almost always remained a phantom promise. The result was a discourse that valued American men, paternity, and whiteness at the expense of Vietnamese mothers and Asian identities. Again, the unstated corollary was straightforward: Asians were not *seen* as Americans.

Most recent studies of Vietnamese Amerasians have been embedded in the growing literature on transracial adoptions, and, in particular, analyses of the award-winning documentary *Daughter of Danang*.⁵ Scholars have powerfully tied the histories of adoption to U.S. imperialism, violence, and militarism, analyzing the rhetoric of “kidnapping” and “saving” foreign children in popular discourse and diplomatic relations.⁶ Many of the tropes that mark international adoption, such as the prominence of photography and the discourse of rescue, were also actively at work in the popular construction of Amerasians. However, the adoption literature by definition focuses on the histories of children separated from their biological mothers and then claimed as American based on their inclusion in white, middle-class families. In contrast, the majority of Vietnamese Amerasians who came to the United States did so as young adults, and they were not adopted on arrival. This distinction is critical, because politicians and the media presented Vietnamese Amerasians as Americans based on their phenotype and mixed-racial identities rather than their inclusion in an American family. In addition, the resulting immigration policies forced Amerasians to perform prescribed racial identities and family roles before U.S. government officials, thus repeating many of the tropes and patterns of the exclusion era.

The Americanized image of the Amerasian also stood in stark contrast to long-standing anti-Asian stereotypes. Historically, cultural representations of Asian Americans emphasized yellowface minstrelsy, the “yellow peril” personified by Fu Manchu, and ubiquitous anti-Asian caricatures during World War II. The stereotype of the cruel and crafty Asian enemy was then regrafted onto the Vietnamese during the war in Vietnam, as both the popular media and military training circulated racist portrayals of Vietnamese as “gooks” and undifferentiated “Viet Cong.”⁷ Given

this historic framework, the identification of Vietnamese Amerasians as prototypical Americans proved all the more notable, and underscored the ways in which the U.S. media defined Amerasians apart from other Asian and Asian American populations.

In Vietnam, Amerasians did confront heightened levels of isolation and dislocation, and they were overrepresented among Vietnam's poorest families and street children after the war. The U.S. journalists who documented Amerasians' lives emphasized their harassment as *bui doi* (children of dust) and *my lai* (a pejorative term for half-Vietnamese, half-American) on the streets and by the Vietnamese government. While this essay takes a critical look at Amerasian policies and representations, I would like to be clear about the hard work of countless refugee workers and advocates who sought better lives for Amerasians. Amerasians in Vietnam faced psychological, cultural, and economic hardships, and *my den* (Amerasians with African American fathers) faced additional marginalization. In interviews and testimonies, Amerasians repeatedly referred to taunting, teasing, and social exclusion. Black Amerasians recalled particularly traumatic cases of rejection and discrimination and often faced severe rejection in Vietnam.⁸ Despite the importance of these stories, this essay does not examine the lives, identities, or difficult choices Vietnamese Amerasians experienced in Vietnam and the United States.⁹ Instead, it analyzes the ideological work whereby congressional representatives and the mass media redefined Amerasians as *Americans* and potential vessels of reconciliation.

The essay continues by tracing the 1980s debate over immigration alongside politicians' increased focus on POWs during the Reagan era. The essay focuses on the Reagan presidency because of the significant legislation and the heightened level of media attention on Vietnamese Amerasians during these years. It then analyzes the ways in which popular representations of Vietnamese Amerasians privileged paternity and whiteness even as Amerasians' experiences directly challenged U.S. administrative epistemologies of race and sexuality. Thus, Amerasian policies contained a central paradox: they expedited Asian immigration to the United States while at the same time reinscribed histories of racial discrimination and exclusion into the law.

THE ORDERLY DEPARTURE, CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE, AND THE HOMECOMING ACT

Amerasians' eventual privileged entrance into the United States was a stark departure from the anti-Asian and anti-immigrant rhetoric, legislation, and even violence at play in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The congressional and political debates surrounding their rapid change in status underscored how U.S. political actors defined Amerasians as a population apart from immigrants or refugees at large. Rather than "permanent resident aliens," "perpetual foreigners," or "illegal aliens," Amerasians by the end of the decade entered the United States with legal status, rights to refugee benefits, and public claims that they were already Americans.¹⁰

The Orderly Departure Program (ODP) became the primary vehicle for Amerasian immigration in the 1980s and early 1990s. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), Vietnam, and receiving third countries, including the United States, established the ODP in 1979 in order to put a halt to the Vietnamese refugee crisis and regularize Vietnamese migration.¹¹ The ODP created mechanisms for Vietnamese to travel to the United States, and it privileged Vietnamese who had ties to the U.S. government during the war and clearly reflected U.S. Cold War priorities.¹² Vietnamese applicants had to apply to the ODP either as immigrants or as refugees with asylum claims, and then gain an exit visa from the Vietnamese government and an entrance visa from the United States. Despite the double bureaucracies, endless red tape, and often high cost of bribes in Vietnam, between 1979 and 1999 approximately 500,000 Vietnamese immigrated to the United States via the ODP.¹³ At the outset, Amerasians had quite limited access to the ODP, since the United States did not initially define them as refugees and few fell under the stipulations of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act. According to the 1965 immigration law, foreign children of U.S. citizens qualified as "immediate relatives" and therefore were admitted into the United States; however, every immigrant "shall be presumed to be a nonpreference immigrant until he establishes to the satisfaction of the consular officer and the immigration officer that . . . he is an immediate relative of a United States citizen."¹⁴ Amerasians had to prove their relationship to a specific U.S. citizen. Only a few individual American fathers came forward to sponsor

their families, and thus the vast majority of Amerasians fell outside the law and did not qualify for exit visas. Without individual family sponsors, the ODP relegated Amerasians into the lowest preference category.¹⁵

The regulation of Southeast Asian refugees into the United States responded to, but did not quell, growing anti-Asian and anti-immigrant politics. American popular disillusionment and anger with the U.S. war in Vietnam often translated into a particular war-related prejudice against Vietnamese refugees. As early as 1975, the majority of Americans did not welcome Southeast Asian refugees and did not support their entry into the United States.¹⁶ In 1977, the *New York Times* reported that many members of Congress were "unenthusiastic" about admitting more Indochinese refugees.¹⁷ It later reported that 57 percent of Americans opposed the entry of more Vietnamese: "They are arriving at a time when the enthusiasm and publicity surrounding the Vietnamese refugees have waned considerably."¹⁸ The *Economist* seconded this sentiment, adding that Americans disliked that "the Vietnam War should come back, in the persons of its victims, to haunt Americans on their own ground."¹⁹ While Vietnamese Amerasians were almost always presented in the popular media as apart from this larger, more problematic Vietnamese population, policies aimed at limiting Vietnamese refugees structured the migration possibilities of all Vietnamese, including Amerasians. Moreover the growing number of Vietnamese refugees dovetailed with Japan's rising industrial growth and the concurrent anti-Asian xenophobia in the United States. One of the most well known and tragic examples of this heightened nativism was the 1982 murder of Chinese American Vincent Chin. In 1982, two white Detroit autoworkers chased and killed Chin after an altercation at a local strip club. At one point, a witness claimed that the defendants blamed "people like Chin" for Americans losing their job, and thus illustrating that the defendants saw Chin, a Chinese American, in the same category as Japanese car manufacturers. The two defendants were charged with second-degree murder, but through a plea bargain of manslaughter avoided jail time and were fined a mere \$3,780.²⁰ The murder of Vincent Chin signaled the ongoing physical violence against Asians in the United States along with the perceived interchangeability between Asian American national groups. Finally, the 1980s witnessed growing public apprehension

about Mexican Americans and a political movement to pass immigration reform. Popular anger at undocumented Mexican migration spurred lawmakers to pass the 1986 IRCA. Anti-immigration advocates created the fervor for the legislation, but ultimately IRCA allowed close to three million undocumented migrants to apply for legal status, while the employer sanctions, which aimed to limit undocumented workers, remained largely ineffective.²¹ Although not directed at Vietnamese migration per se, this legislative project became the vehicle to which the Amerasian exception was first attached.

In 1982, Republican Congressman Stewart McKinney introduced legislation that provided Amerasian children with greater opportunities to apply for immigration visas as an amendment to a much larger immigration reform bill, which later became the framework for IRCA.²² The omnibus immigration bill, which had been introduced by Senator Alan Simpson and Congressman Romano Mazzoli with the primary aim of controlling illegal immigration through employee sanctions, increased enforcement of immigration laws and established a legalization process for undocumented immigrants. Although this bill passed the Senate, it came to a standstill in the House of Representatives.²³ At this juncture, an aide to President Reagan argued that if Congress separated the Amerasian provision from the larger, more comprehensive and controversial bill, a stand-alone Amerasian Amendment's "possibilities for passage" would be "excellent."²⁴

The Reagan administration decided to give more publicity to the Amerasian Amendment as part of its campaign to humanize the president. Reagan's close political aide Lyn Nofziger noted that the president had an image problem and that the "public thinks he doesn't care about people." To counter this perception of aloofness, Nofziger suggested Reagan change public perception, not through one grand act, but rather through "a lot of little things." To this end, the Amerasian Amendment came at an opportune time and would help the White House get involved and "show it cares a little bit about people."²⁵ Executive officials agreed that Reagan's personal support for the Amerasian Amendment would be "a very well received humanitarian gesture."²⁶

While this humanitarian language was offered on the one hand, Amerasian legislation also provided the opportunity to delineate who had

claims on the United States and who did not. The Amerasian Amendment eventually achieved overwhelming bipartisan support in Congress.²⁷ In contrast, the larger immigration reform act stalled out in the U.S. House of Representatives, and IRCA had to be shelved and wait another four years for passage. In preparing for President Reagan's well-publicized signing ceremony, Assistant Attorney General Robert A. McConnell encouraged the White House to use the event to advocate a more sweeping immigration bill. McConnell noted that the Amerasian Amendment had been de-coupled from the larger bill for political expediency, but he concluded that it could still be used to promote broader congressional reform.²⁸

In the end, Reagan's White House signing ceremony articulated a liberal welcome to Amerasians in a decidedly romantic idiom. Reagan's speech heralded the amendment as a "humane law" that "should touch every American's heart." He praised the generosity of the United States and concluded, "Americans have always opened their hearts to those coming from distant lands to make a new life here, to live in freedom, and to improve their lot. In this case, I think we should go a step further. Instead of saying welcome to these children, we should say welcome home."²⁹ In these three sentences, Reagan erased decades of Asian exclusion laws that persisted well into the midcentury and ignored the growing hostility toward Southeast Asian refugees in his own contemporary moment. With the ending flourish welcoming Amerasians "home," he also claimed Amerasians as Americans, further distinguishing them from immigrants and other foreign populations.

Interestingly, the archives also contained a "proposed signing speech" that was either jettisoned or substantially revamped. Reagan's proposed speech was notable for the way in which it connected Amerasians to broader immigration reform. Like the final speech, the proposed speech began on an inclusive note, applauding that "we are a nation of immigrants" and saluting the "instinctive generosity" of the American people.³⁰ It also clearly distinguished between Amerasians and immigrants at large:

While we will maintain our proud tradition of accepting immigrants and refugees to our shores, not even this great and prosperous nation can accept all who would come here. In fairness to our own people, not all of who have realized the dreams that brought their fathers here, we must act to regain control of our borders and our destiny.

Legislation now pending in the Congress, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1982, would accomplish necessary reforms of our immigration laws to curb illegal immigration, while sustaining legal migration within fair and realistic limits.

I strongly urge the Congress to enact this important bipartisan legislation when it returns from the fall recess. If it does, the promise we make today to the Amerasian children and the promise our great experiment in liberty has held for those who came before surely will endure.³¹

In this draft, the speechwriter suggested that Reagan welcome Amerasian children, again as Americans, rather than as immigrants. The speech also paired the inclusion of Amerasians with the need to “regain control of our borders and our destiny.” It concluded that the United States’ “promise” to Vietnamese Amerasian children necessitated limiting illegal immigration. In this case, Amerasians would have been heralded as exceptional immigrants who would be welcomed with open arms, while other immigrants would presumably be held back at the border. Notably, the Amerasian Amendment itself applied to very few cases. It had gained bipartisan support and sailed through Congress precisely *because* it provided preferential immigration status for an exceptionally limited number of young people.³²

Congress intentionally narrowed the scope of the 1982 amendment to assuage diplomatic and immigration concerns, and it in fact did little to increase Amerasians’ abilities to relocate to the United States. Amerasians would still need to produce official documents proving their paternity, and they would need an American sponsor, presumably the young person’s father. In addition, physical appearance would now be taken into consideration in determining eligibility. These provisions only applied to minors, and Amerasians over the age of twenty-one were subjected to standard immigration procedures.³³ Lawmakers designed the amendment to make it difficult to immigrate, since few Amerasians had birth certificates or other “proof” of their American parentage. Even fewer had a U.S. sponsor. And notably, Amerasians’ Vietnamese mothers were not included in the legislation.

For Amerasians, the 1982 amendment remained almost exclusively symbolic. Few young people possessed the required paperwork or were

willing to leave their primary Vietnamese caregivers. As a result, most Amerasians continued to utilize the ODP as their primary means to enter the United States. Between 1982 and 1988, approximately 4,000 Amerasians gained access to the United States through the ODP.³⁴ Amerasians often found themselves in a bureaucratic nightmare where they were burdened with heavy bribes on the Vietnamese side and the need to document and "prove" they were "American" on the U.S. side. The ODP was notoriously bureaucratic. Moreover, because the United States would not engage in direct negotiations with Vietnam, it stationed its representatives in Bangkok. The distance between the State Department headquarters in Bangkok and UNHCR representatives in Ho Chi Minh City inhibited cooperation. Kyle Horst was one of the first American ODP officials stationed directly in Ho Chi Minh City, but he, too, could not make a final decision without approval from U.S. officials in Bangkok. He soon became disillusioned and frustrated with the program: "We busted our butts, and then cases would sit on a desk in Bangkok for six months. . . . It was criminal and immoral to have the policy guys in Washington playing with Amerasians as political pawns. They had no conscience. I came to the conclusion that the State Department people making this policy were depraved."³⁵ As a result of this impasse, the ODP virtually stopped processing Vietnamese applicants from 1985 to 1987. This diplomatic dispute exemplified the political hostilities and frustrations between Vietnamese and U.S. officials, and Amerasians were often cast as the proverbial diplomatic football, with each side trying to win "points" against the other.³⁶

In this standoff, the American media continued to play a decisive role in Amerasian legislation. In 1985, *Long Island Newsday* profiled Le Van Minh in a feature story. A young teenager with a physical disability, Minh said he had lived on the streets of Ho Chi Minh City since he was ten years old. In the accompanying photo by Audrey Tiernan, he appeared gaunt and hunched over on all fours, holding out a paper flower for sale.³⁷ Minh was far from alone in his destitution, but what set Minh apart and made him more visible to Western photographers and travelers was his mixed-race physical appearance. The journalist commented that Minh's livelihood depended on whether "a foreigner would be moved by his American face and broken body" and then feel moved to toss some dong (Vietnamese currency) his way.³⁸

Unbeknown to Le Van Minh, Tiernan's chance photograph mesmerized a group of American high school students. His physique evoked sympathy and compassion, but it was his mixed-race appearance that generated the campaign to bring Le Van Minh "home." These Long Island students successfully collected over 25,000 petition signatures and lobbied Vietnam's United Nations representative, Nguyen Dang Quang, and their U.S. representative, Robert J. Mrazek. Representative Mrazek saw an opportunity to champion an emotionally charged cause that could cut across partisan lines.³⁹ According to *Newsday*, Mrazek saw Le Van Minh as a "symbol of cooperation" and a "central figure in an attempt to break the diplomatic impasse between the United States and Vietnam." He hoped the case would be a catalyst in reinvigorating talks over Amerasian immigration and the remains of American MIAs.⁴⁰ Both the U.S. and the Vietnamese governments cut through the bureaucracy in order to expedite Le Van Minh's exit visa. Mrazek campaigned to enable Amerasians' easier access to the United States. In 1987, he sponsored the Indochinese Refugee Resettlement and Protection Act, commonly known as the Homecoming Act.

The Amerasian Homecoming Act again achieved bipartisan support, and President Reagan signed it into law. Passed close to a year after the passage of IRCA, it responded to many of the criticisms that had plagued the 1982 Amerasian Amendment. Despite the bipartisan support, the Reagan Justice Department and State Department both opposed the Homecoming Act's passage. The Justice Department argued that it merely duplicated provisions in the ODP and departed from established procedures. It also feared, correctly it turned out, that the Homecoming Act "could invite rampant fraud and misrepresentation."⁴¹ The State Department concurred that the Homecoming Act was unnecessary, because the ODP procedures had already been improved due to increased diplomatic interaction.⁴² Despite this opposition, emotion and sentimentality drove the passage of the Homecoming Act, and it remained politically popular. Through congressional legislation and administrative changes, the United States had finally granted Amerasians privileged status within the ODP.

Alongside these machinations over immigration legislation, U.S. politicians and the media also transferred "homecoming" from POWs/MIAs onto Vietnamese Amerasians. The fantasy of returning POWs/MIAs loomed large in the 1980s; however, the tens of thousands of men

and women coming to the United States were not lost U.S. soldiers or recently released POWs. Instead, they were Vietnamese men and women.⁴³ As such, Amerasians were not only reframed as prototypical Americans and symbols of the United States' generous immigration policies, but they also became substitutes for the United States' lost soldiers in Vietnam. The U.S. media and politicians transformed Vietnamese Amerasians into an emblematic population that could be brought "home."

During the 1980s, the United States' postwar diplomatic objectives with Vietnam remained fixated on POWs/MIAs. As POWs/MIAs became key figures in public discourse, Amerasians became increasingly visible in congressional debates and speeches. U.S. legislators began to categorize Amerasians as a "humanitarian" issue along with POWs/MIAs and reeducation camp survivors. These groups were among the select topics on which the United States would engage in dialogue with Vietnamese diplomats. For example, congressional leaders often spoke about Amerasians as an addendum to POW/MIA concerns. Senator Frank Murkowski explicitly linked four issues: "The POW/MIA issue, reeducation camp political prisoners, Amerasian children, and the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea are all of utmost concern to us."⁴⁴ In an emotional speech about the special presidential emissary for POW/MIA affairs General John Vessey's upcoming trip to Vietnam, senator and former POW John McCain argued that the United States could never "close that unhappy part of America's history . . . without a full accounting of those who were still listed as missing in action." Still, after asserting his support for the search for MIAs, Senator McCain believed that General Vessey should also initiate dialogue on the status of Amerasians: "Other issues to be raised by General Vessey during his trip will include the 30,000 Amerasian children who deserve the opportunity to come to this country if they choose to do so."⁴⁵ In these speeches for the public record, members of Congress always cited POWs/MIAs first, but after making these pledges, many then flagged Amerasians as a population of particular U.S. interest and a topic on which direct dialogue should begin.

This discourse, substituting U.S. POWs with Vietnamese Amerasians, occurred not just at the political level but also in the cultural realm. In the 1980s, Hollywood produced a seemingly endless number of POW/MIA rescue movies, most notably Sylvester Stalone's *Rambo: First Blood*

Part II and Chuck Norris's *Missing in Action* series. With a pointed lack of historical accuracy, these films celebrated a veteran's return to Vietnam, saving his men, his masculinity, and his country's pride.⁴⁶ Notably in *Missing in Action, Part 3*, the Chuck Norris character, Colonel Jim Braddock, returned to Vietnam not to rescue his abandoned comrades, but to rescue his Vietnamese wife and his unknown Amerasian son.⁴⁷

Journalists and men and women writing letters to the editor to local newspapers also reframed Amerasians alternately as "veterans," "prisoners of war," and "missing in action." For example, the *Chicago Tribune* titled an Op-Ed on Vietnamese Amerasians, "War 'vets' who are not yet home."⁴⁸ A series of letters to the editor in *Newsday* also reflected this easy substitution between Amerasians and U.S. servicemen. For example, one man wrote: "The two issues of MIAs and Amerasian children can be resolved quickly if we have the political will to do it." He went on to linguistically place Amerasians in the same category as POWs, calling them "hostage" to an "inept" immigration policy.⁴⁹ Another letter writer also linked Amerasians and POWs by suggesting that Amerasians' fathers had not "deserted" their children, but rather those same fathers "may [be] languish[ing]" in prisons in North Vietnam.⁵⁰ Yet another letter writer demanded that the U.S. government "bring out every last one"; however, he did not mean missing U.S. soldiers, but rather Vietnamese Amerasians.⁵¹ Within the pop culture zeitgeist, Amerasians became a potent specter, potentially embodying the American soldier who had been left behind.

This social and cultural context helps explain the Homecoming Act's broad congressional and public support. Unlike POWs/MIAs, Amerasians were a population that actually could be transported to the United States. The legislation's popular and emotive stake in "homecoming" eerily echoed the 1973 POW agreement under the Paris Peace Treaty, which announced the release of U.S. POWs. This earlier 1973 agreement had also been dubbed Operation Homecoming.⁵² Thus, the rhetoric and the official policy of POW/MIA exchanges and Amerasian immigration became linguistically coupled.

These congressional and administrative changes opened the doors for thousands of Vietnamese Amerasians to enter the United States. The United States still refused to recognize Vietnam, but it finally agreed to

place State Department officials directly in Ho Chi Minh City, bypassing the Bangkok bureaucracy and making the process more efficient.⁵³ Most important, the new framework enabled all Amerasians, whether or not they were legitimate or in contact with their fathers, to be first-priority applicants in the ODP. This radically changed Amerasians' status from low-priority to privileged applicants. In addition, it provided mechanisms for Amerasians to sponsor their mothers, spouses, and siblings to accompany them to the United States. The burden of proof diminished, and many informal documents and, again, physical appearance became sufficient evidence for Amerasians to gain exit visas.

Triggered by the large number of photojournalists and media attention, politicians and advocates encouraged a policy that would authorize U.S. officials to judge people's right to immigrate based on their racial appearance. Representative Tom Ridge evocatively explained, "The face is the roadmap."⁵⁴ More than a decade later Bill Kurtis stated, "It was an example of how journalism should work. You communicate a problem to an intelligent audience and then people act."⁵⁵ As a result of this change, Amerasian applications flooded the ODP. Between 1987 and 1993, approximately 20,000 Amerasians with 54,000 Vietnamese family members resettled in the United States.⁵⁶

GENDER, FAMILY, AND THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF "HOME"

Like most other laws governing Asian immigration and exclusion, gender, sexuality, and the parameters of family defined U.S. Amerasian policies. In the earliest Chinese exclusion legislation, the 1875 Page Act, the United States gendered Asian immigration by singling out and excluding the vast majority of Chinese women migrants. The Page Act forbade the entrance of prostitutes into the United States, and administrators of the law, like most Americans, assumed most Chinese women entering the United States were prostitutes. The Page Act set in motion the legal framework to exclude Chinese migrants, and, in particular, it placed the burden of proof on individual women to "prove" through documentation and social performance that they were *not* prostitutes.⁵⁷ It also established the precedent where Chinese women's migration was governed by their family ties and their ability to document these relationships. During the

exclusion era of 1882–1943, the vast majority of Chinese women who entered the United States did so as dependents, as wives and daughters, of male relatives with U.S. citizenship status.⁵⁸ This practice continued in the postwar era, when Asian women could gain entry into the United States as military wives through the 1945 War Brides Act and 1946 Chinese War Brides Act. With the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, these women were then able to sponsor their families to the United States through family reunification.⁵⁹ In each case, women's marital status, or lack thereof, was a crucial determinant of whether she would be admitted into the country. In comparison, Amerasians' entry into the United States was founded on the sexual relationships between Vietnamese women and American men, but not on international and interracial marriages. The histories of both exclusion and immigration based on marriage underscore the changing status of Vietnamese Amerasians' mothers and the elision of U.S. sexual occupation in Vietnam.

Early 1980s U.S. policy valued the U.S. father at the expense of the Vietnamese mother, creating a sentimentalist discourse that rooted "family" in an American father, albeit often an apocryphal one. Perhaps no icon in popular culture better demonstrated the romanticism attributed to American fathers and Vietnamese mothers than the 1991 musical production of *Miss Saigon*.⁶⁰ In fact, a photograph of a Vietnamese mother stoically saying good-bye to her sobbing Amerasian child motivated writers Alain Boublil and Claude Michel Schonberg to pen the musical.⁶¹ In the dramatic finale, Kim, a Vietnamese woman, commits suicide, believing that her American lover, Chris, will take on the obligation of raising their mixed-race son. While most scholars and critics have focused on the casting of the play and the gendered tropes of sacrifice, there has been less attention to the immigration question that Kim's suicide solved. Kim herself will never have to visit a U.S. consul and apply for a visa, nor will Chris have to sponsor her to come to the United States.

The 1982 Amerasian Amendment deliberately excluded Vietnamese mothers from its purview. It provided only for children whose U.S. fathers had agreed to sponsor them, but this cohort was only a small percentage of the Amerasian population. Furthermore, the law required the Amerasian's mother to revoke all custody rights; the law stated that "the alien's mother

or guardian has in writing irrevocably released the alien for emigration.”⁶² Under this legislation, Amerasians had to leave their mothers, siblings, spouses, and guardians in Vietnam. In practice, the 1982 legislation forced most Amerasians to choose between their Vietnamese families and the United States, and, more pointedly, the law made clear that American men mattered and Vietnamese women did not.

The political and media rhetoric thus valorized American fathers and minimized the importance of Vietnamese women as mothers and parents. For example, Congressman Mazzoli argued that “many of them [Amerasians] will be reunited with fathers they have not seen in many years. Others will be adopted or sponsored by generous Americans who want to help these young people live happy lives.”⁶³ In congressional testimony, Amerasian advocate Walter Martindale stated that a Vietnamese woman had offered up her children to him: “Their mother, pleaded with me in 1973 that I take the children, not because she did not love them but because she was afraid that she could not care for them due to her health and the war. She also believed that there was no real place for them in Vietnam, particularly if the Communists won.”⁶⁴ Again, this narrative reinforced the American desire for and inclusion of Vietnamese children, while Vietnamese women were either absent (as in the first case) or all-sacrificing (as in the second).

The legislation illustrated the U.S. government’s disregard for the former wives and girlfriends of GIs abroad. This preference did not originate with the ODP, and in many cases had its precedents in adoption operations, which sometimes “rescued” Vietnamese children who had mothers.⁶⁵ This did not mean that Vietnamese women easily surrendered their children or that children willingly left their mothers. For example, Kerry, an Amerasian man, remembered that “I went with my wife and my mother, and we applied for the Orderly Departure Program. . . . I was accepted to go, but only me, not my mother or my wife. I would not leave them, I refused to go alone.”⁶⁶ The U.S. media and political establishment had embraced Amerasians as innately American, while shuffling their Vietnamese families to the side. Rather than identifying Amerasian young people as part of a social network with mothers, siblings, or extended family, the 1982 law and the initial years of the ODP program had defined Amerasians as autonomous individuals.

The policy also hoped to erase the sexual context of the U.S. military's presence in Vietnam.⁶⁷ While often dismissed and marginalized as prostitutes by both the U.S. and the Vietnamese governments, the women involved with American men had entered a range of relationships, from one-night stands and prostitution to long-term relationships and marriages. Women who migrated to the cities because of wartime and economic pressures often expressed ambivalence about these relationships. For example, Lien, the mother of an Amerasian child, recalled her resentment toward her American partner during the war: "What I mean is that sometime I don't understand him too much, and he don't understand me either. Like, you know, he has friends come to the house and he says to them, 'This is my girlfriend.' I already have one daughter with him, and he calls me 'girlfriend.' I don't like that it hurts me. I say, 'Why don't you call me your wife. . . .' Many Vietnamese women living with American men have trouble like this."⁶⁸

By initially failing to include Amerasians' mothers in U.S. immigration legislation, U.S. politicians ignored and disrespected Vietnamese women in much the same way that many American GIs had during the war. At its core, the 1982 Amerasian Amendment aptly reflected the U.S. government's inability and unwillingness to recognize Amerasians' actual family connections. Preferential immigration was thus premised solely on paternity and clear racial markers. The U.S. legislation clearly intended to value "family" and "home," but only if it was an American family and an American home.

Soon after the 1982 amendment, refugee resettlement workers from voluntary agencies, such as the International Catholic Migration Commission, the Pearl S. Buck Foundation, Holt International Services, Save the Children, and Church World Service, threatened to withdraw their services if Amerasians were deliberately removed from their Vietnamese families.⁶⁹ The State Department recognized that the implementation of such a program would be disastrous and mitigated the situation by reclassifying Amerasians and their mothers as refugees.⁷⁰ By 1985, the ODP had included increased, albeit limited, spaces for Amerasians' mothers and half-siblings.⁷¹ Supporters of the 1987 Homecoming Act also responded to critics who derided the earlier policy of breaking up families instead of

reuniting them. Beginning in 1988, mothers, siblings, and spouses were eligible to accompany Amerasians to the United States, and the number of Amerasian applicants skyrocketed.⁷² Unlike earlier legislation that had granted Asian women entry into the United States on the basis of their marriages to U.S. military personnel, this new policy changed their opportunities. Marriage itself was no longer the key. Now, Vietnamese women could gain access not on the basis of their marital status, but via their maternal relationship to a child.

The Homecoming Act and the ODP created many unintended consequences, inadvertently dividing many families and forging new ones. Because of their newly privileged immigration status, Amerasians became commodified.⁷³ After 1988, Vietnamese Amerasians could sponsor their Vietnamese mothers, spouses, siblings, and caretakers. Amerasians' preferential immigration status led to the troubling proliferation of "fake families." This was a practice where wealthier Vietnamese families paid Amerasian youths (or their caregivers) in order for the Amerasian to claim this new family as his or her own, and thereby expedite the wealthier family's own immigration. Amerasians needed to navigate the corrupt Vietnamese bureaucracy, which was plagued by a sophisticated network of bribery and forgery. Families paid between \$50 and \$5,000 in official processing fees, forged documents, and forced bribes.⁷⁴ Given the costs, "fake families" proliferated, and hundreds of wealthy and middle-class Vietnamese families literally bought Amerasians to facilitate their own immigration. Other Amerasians agreed to sell themselves, because they needed a wealthy sponsor to pay all the fees. Even Amerasians who wanted to sponsor their biological families had to fork over hundreds of dollars for the necessary documents and local bribes. As a result, Amerasians often found themselves in vulnerable positions and at risk of exploitation.⁷⁵ As such, family could be constructed on multiple registers, and linkages to Amerasians could be based on genetic ties, care-taking, or economic compensation.

Far from unprecedented, Amerasians' "fake families" fell into a pattern where the state both demanded and distrusted Asians' claims to family connections in the United States. This process had historical antecedents in Asian immigration beginning in the late nineteenth century. In order

to get around the Chinese Exclusion Act, Chinese Americans created an elaborate network of Chinese “paper sons” who successfully had entered the United States through the use of false relationships. This history, alongside a hostile federal bureaucracy, meant that the United States was ready to investigate, distrust, and deny Chinese immigrants.⁷⁶ Although instituted more than a century later, the ODP did much the same thing, forcing people to prove family ties and sometimes denying “real” families, while at other times admitting “fake” ones. By the early 1990s, the U.S. government estimated that up to half of the accepted Amerasian families were false cases.⁷⁷

By granting Amerasians preferential immigration status, the United States unwittingly complicated the notion of family. “Family” became relative, a matter of paperwork, forged documents, and a choreographed performance for U.S. officials. Ostensibly on a rescue mission, U.S. officials fell into a position where they had to distinguish between “real” and “fake” families. One U.S. administrator bragged, “I assume fraud in every case I see. Sure it’s fun playing God, but we sometimes get it wrong. So I long ago decided it’s better to refuse a real case than let a fake Amerasian into the United States.”⁷⁸ Thus, this law, intended symbolically to reunite families, in fact pressured Amerasians to abandon their families out of financial necessity. Moreover, it gave U.S. officials the power to judge who was and who was not a family. Even as policy makers were congratulating themselves for bringing Amerasians “home,” their migration continued to play out in a landscape defined by exclusion and arbitrary bureaucratic decisions.

The supposed “real” family or father-child reunion could be even more fraught. Few Amerasians would be reunited with their fathers, yet the promise of this fantasy remained. Early accounts highlighted exceptional cases where the father met his Amerasian children at the airport. For example, the *New York Times* featured civilian operator Luis Villegas, who “had never given up the goal of reuniting the family in the United States,” and Ernest Crosby, a civilian aircraft electrician, who met his family at the airport and exclaimed, “I’m the happiest man in the world.”⁷⁹ In far more cases, fathers were less than enthusiastic about the presence of their progeny in the United States. The *Washington Post* reported that between

1989 and 1992, the Red Cross found only twenty-one fathers, fifteen of whom asked that their phone numbers and addresses be withheld from their Amerasian children. As early as 1985, *Newsweek* identified a former Special Forces officer who had learned that his Amerasian daughter and her mother had arrived in the United States. He eschewed contact with his Vietnamese daughter and described himself as a "standard male shit. . . . I have a family now. I can't let anything intrude on our happiness."⁸⁰ Another veteran responded, "Let me tell you one thing right now. Never, and I mean never, will you call any member of my family concerning any item involving or in reference to events in my past."⁸¹ In their mission to evade returned Amerasian children, both men invoked the importance of family, their *current* families, from the encroachment of the past and Vietnam. Just as important, these men could define and decide whom they counted as family and whom they did not. Clearly, for the majority of these men, their current families outweighed the genetic tie to their Amerasian children.

Even as Amerasians provided a potential national claim to reconciliation and redemption in the popular imagination, their individual experiences belied such romantic notions. The publicly heralded value of family thus was undercut time and time again: Vietnamese mothers were devalued; fraudulent families proliferated; and in the end the vast majority of putative American fathers wanted nothing to do with their returned Amerasian children. Sexuality and gender remained embedded in the 1980s congressional legislation and the ODP. However, there was a substantive change from the past. Amerasian policies not only fostered romantic notions of fatherhood, but they invoked a new racial ideal: the conception of a mixed-race American face.⁸²

"AN AMERICAN FACE"

While Asians had historically been excluded from the U.S. polity on the basis of their "inability to assimilate," the popular media and political discourse embraced Vietnamese Amerasians as *naturally* or *obviously* American, rather than as immigrants. In fact, the media and, more materially, U.S. immigration policy elevated this mixed-race population as

quintessentially American. This did not translate into concrete political status or citizenship rights for Vietnamese Amerasians, but rather it was a call to a more emotive and racialized American identity. It was also their “Caucasian” features that generally defined Amerasians as “Americans.” Mixed-race Afro-Asian features were also deemed “American” in the popular media, but there was no mention of Amerasian children with potentially Latino, Native American, or Asian American fathers.

Photojournalism and the media played a pivotal role in the representation of Amerasians in the United States. The genesis of a special Amerasian immigration program began when American journalists returned to Vietnam in the early 1980s to provide retrospectives on the U.S. withdrawal and the North Vietnamese victory. Vietnamese Amerasians selling peanuts and postcards on street corners haunted many reporters. Journalists argued that Amerasians represented a moral challenge to the United States. Their abandonment was shameful and a “national embarrassment.”⁸³ These images became emblematic of the United States’ forgotten responsibilities and failed mission in Vietnam. The *Christian Science Monitor* reported: “Who can forget the pitiful sight of those manifestly half-American children standing in the monsoon rain of Ho Chi Minh City and begging American TV crews to save them from a land where they are not wanted?”⁸⁴

Notably, photographs often accompanied these feature articles. Vietnamese women and Amerasian children posed for photographers’ cameras, hoping that the journalist would help them “reunite with their American relatives.” As Bill Kurtis wrote in his 1980 essay, “Perhaps a new picture will color Americans’ memories of the war—the picture of children who are unable to go to school, condemned to live their years in the streets of Saigon because they have the wrong face—an American face.”⁸⁵ Personally moved by the Amerasians’ stories and their mothers’ pleas for help, Kurtis helped smuggle their desperate and furtive letters to an unnamed diplomat who had, in turn, agreed to deliver their letters to the United Nations. Kurtis ended his article with an emotional challenge for his readers to reexamine the American intervention in Vietnam now that they could share a personal and seemingly genetic national link with Vietnamese Amerasian children. Other mainstream magazines, such as *Newsweek* and

Parade, published photo essays and feature stories on Amerasians.⁸⁶ The classic picture was of a mother and young person holding a picture of an American GI father.⁸⁷ In these images, the mother, child, and father could be reunited symbolically in a single photograph. Notably, by the late 1980s Amerasians were no longer children, and the photos reflected that they were adolescents and young adults.

Racially loaded captions often accompanied the photos, which were intended to provoke sympathy and recognition. For example, the captions in *Parade* asked: "Aren't they our children?" and stated, "With such features, few can doubt that this young woman has American blood."⁸⁸ In another example, the *Christian Science Monitor* reported on one child that "this little girl's father was clearly black."⁸⁹ In the *Washington Post*, a journalist described another young man as a "strapping youth with light brown eyes and obvious Caucasian features."⁹⁰ This sentiment that Amerasians' racial and thereby national identity was "clear" and "obvious" pervaded the popular press. The photo essays assumed that with a pointed caption or phrase, the reader would viscerally recognize the "American-ness" in these young people and identify with them.

Not only did these magazines and newspapers profile Vietnamese Amerasians, they also repeatedly commented on their physical attractiveness. This discourse dwelled on their appearance and inferred that Amerasians were somehow more beautiful than either Vietnamese or white or black Americans. For example, in 1982 Hollywood film star Julie Andrews went to Ho Chi Minh City as a supporter of Operation California, a relief agency based in Beverly Hills. On return, Andrews commented on her emotional response to Amerasian children: "They are beautiful looking children. . . . My God, they are simply lovely. It's a real jerk to the soul—and to the senses. You think you know the face. Some of them look very Caucasian. They come running up to you and say, 'Are you an American? I'm one too.'"⁹¹ While Andrews's comments are meant to be sympathetic and heartfelt, the equation of "beautiful" with looking "very Caucasian" underscored the way in which U.S. popular culture represented Amerasians' racial "look" as ultimately connected to whiteness. In another stand-alone photograph in the *Los Angeles Times*, the paper printed a photograph of a young girl in between a gate with the simple caption, "Amerasian beauty."⁹²

In this strange aftermath of a lost war against a nonwhite, Communist country, mixed-race people became valued as model Americans. Of course, legal barriers to interracial marriages between whites and African Americans and whites and Asians had existed in the United States for decades. It was not until the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act, when the U.S. war in Vietnam was under way, that the U.S. Supreme Court finally overturned these laws in the 1967 *Loving* case. Ironically, Amerasian advocates erased centuries of racism and taboos against race-mixing and proclaimed that Amerasians deserved to live in America's multiracial society. In this context, U.S. politicians could condemn Vietnam as a racist nation for valuing racial purity and discriminating against Amerasians, while forgetting an American legacy of similar if not even more violent practices. For example, U.S. representative Doug Bereuter from Nebraska argued in Congress, "It is simply a fact that, in many countries in which the U.S. military has had a significant presence those societies place a premium on racial purity. Racial purity, Mr. Speaker, with all the consequences of prejudice, discrimination, and cruel exclusionary practices that implies."⁹³ In a congressional hearing, Walter Martindale argued, "These children, and children like them, would have a happier, more equitable opportunity to achieve their potential in a multi-racial society such as the United States."⁹⁴ In order to repair hierarchies challenged by the civil rights movement and the U.S. war in Vietnam, the political rhetoric attempted to reclaim the moral high ground for the United States. In this scenario, the Vietnamese could be dismissed as racists, while the United States uncritically could congratulate itself as a land of racial tolerance.

At the same time, alongside this discourse of multiracial Americans, journalists, advocates, and politicians also noted that African Americans fathered at least 15 to 25 percent of Amerasian children.⁹⁵ Although initially journalists featured black Amerasians less frequently, as the ODP program progressed, black Amerasians gained more public attention. The disproportionate number of working-class whites and African Americans drafted into the war at the height of the civil rights movement contributed to an idealized image of multiracial combat units. Because such a high proportion of Amerasians "looked" black to the American public, the ODP

and Amerasian immigration policies implicitly included and reinforced African American citizenship, military service, and American identity. In these accounts, African Americans' experiences of racism in the U.S. military were forgotten, and instead black Amerasians were embraced as Americans.⁹⁶

American journalists also subjected Amerasians to the very-American one-drop rule when it came to blackness. For example, an ostensibly sympathetic news article stated that black Amerasians were "culturally Vietnamese, politically American, and genetically black." Carolyn Tisdale, the Memphis Catholic Charities director and an African American woman, reiterated: "I see them as black. I know that's what everyone else is going to see. Realistically that is what they are going to have to deal with."⁹⁷ In the United States, a black father's genes superseded Amerasians' cultural heritage, linguistic skills, Vietnamese families, and personal experiences.

This is not to deny that many Amerasians in Vietnam, particularly those with black fathers, faced psychological and economic hardships. In interviews and testimonies, black Amerasians recalled especially disturbing instances of prejudice and hostility.⁹⁸ For example, Thuy, a black Amerasian woman, remembered an argument with her mother in Vietnam: "She [her mother] told me, 'You are stubborn, because of your mixed blood.' I became angry. I told her, 'If I were white and beautiful, you would never have left me.' My mother didn't say anything, she just cried."⁹⁹ Black Amerasians often faced severe isolation and rejection in Vietnam. Abandoned and impoverished, they had the least education and the most serious emotional and economic problems.

This question of who looked American even reached the desk of future Secretary of State Colin Powell in 1988. While still in the Reagan White House, Powell was the point person for President Reagan's concerns about an ABC *World News Tonight* episode that critiqued the U.S. management of the ODP. The television special highlighted three Amerasians, all of whom had difficulty navigating the ODP and had yet to receive U.S. visas. Upset about its negative critique of the U.S. government, Reagan inquired about the show's validity, which set off a brief investigation into the matter. Notably, television and the visual media continued to play a key role in both the political representation of and the political response to Vietnamese

Amerasians all the way up to the president. The White House reported that the ABC show took a “negative slant” on the ODP, without documenting the program’s overall success. In particular, ABC had profiled one child who had been denied a visa because he “could not establish eligibility through documentation or physical appearance.”¹⁰⁰ Rather than question what it meant to prove eligibility through “physical appearance,” the internal White House official reinscribed the idea of static racial categories. The final memo stated that the ODP had denied the case because “the child’s physical appearance does not support Caucasian parentage.”¹⁰¹

ODP officials demanded a complicated combination of official documentation and the right “look.” There were anecdotes of individuals changing their appearance, darkening their skin and teasing their hair to appear blacker or bleaching their skin to look whiter. An ODP official stated, “To pass for an Amerasian, some Vietnamese have operations to make their eyes round. But usually we rely on freckles for proof.”¹⁰² For the most part, young people’s claims rested on their ability to perform a racial identity, be it white or black, that would guarantee their entry into the ODP. Because of the rampant fraud and fake families, Amerasians’ ability to immigrate to the United States diminished over time. For example, in 1987-1988 the ODP approved 90 percent of Amerasian applications, while in 1993 it accepted only 13 percent of the applications.¹⁰³ As a result, a program that was in many ways a watershed for Vietnamese entry into the United States also came to replicate the protocols created during eras of exclusion, namely the need for extensive documentation, oral recall of family details and lineage, and able performances before U.S. officials.

In this legal and bureaucratic morass, the figure of the Hawaiian American emerged for a second time. In almost an aside, an ODP official admitted it was not quite so easy to define an American look. In this case, a boy claimed to have a Hawaiian father, and so “their [his putative family] future hangs on whether an olive-skinned kid with black hair and eyes is going to pass for being half-Hawaiian.”¹⁰⁴ While meant in a somewhat sarcastic tenor, this quotation again almost unwittingly acknowledged an Asian American community and a U.S. military force that would have included Asian American personnel alongside white and African American servicemen. There was no discussion of how one would distinguish

or prove Asian American, Latino, American Indian, or other nonwhite or nonblack heritage. Once again, this spectral Hawaiian father belied the simple racial calculus that had been readily produced and consumed in the media. The emphasis on Amerasians' "American" look, almost always defined by whiteness or blackness, at the expense of their Asian identity or Asian American possibilities, demonstrated that the legacies of U.S. imperialism and Asian exclusion were alive and well in the Homecoming Act.

In the early 1980s, Amerasians gained a symbolic resonance beyond their numbers and intimately intertwined postwar Vietnamese immigration policy with U.S. sexual liaisons and American racial formations. The revamped ODP and the Homecoming Act unwittingly enabled the U.S. government to decide who was and who was not an American based on a quick, physical assessment. When Tom Ridge declared that "the face is the roadmap," the assumption followed that identifying the "face" and the "road" would be straightforward. In fact, this roadmap was far more arbitrary than congressional representatives or journalists suspected, for even as they claimed Amerasians as Americans and welcomed them home, the reality was that Amerasians were nonwhite immigrants who faced severe challenges and an often hostile bureaucracy.

The history of Vietnamese Amerasian legislation and media representation demonstrates how the United States attempted to stage a cathartic closure to the war in Vietnam through the bodies of mixed-race adolescents. Despite what were arguably good intentions, the resulting immigration bureaucracy was shaped by the history of Asian exclusion and the privileging of whiteness and paternity. Rather than creating a model of reconciliation, Amerasian policies ironically highlighted the far-reaching consequences of U.S. military interventions and ongoing racial assumptions in U.S. domestic and foreign relations. The goal of national redemption through the reunion of a nuclear, patriarchal family remained a compelling symbolic story line, but one that revealed more about American political and popular culture than it did about the experiences of Vietnamese Amerasians.

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Notes

1. Bill Kurtis, "The Plight of the Children Abandoned in Vietnam," *New York Times Magazine*, March 2, 1980, SM5+.
2. In a thorough reading of the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Los Angeles Times*, *Christian Science Monitor*, *Chicago Tribune*, *Newsday*, *Newsweek*, and *Time*, I did not find another single instance where the presence of Asian American servicemen, Hawaiian servicemen, or other Asian military personnel (for example, Korean) was acknowledged at all. For recent work on the colonial construction of a "Hawaiian" identity, see Rona Tamiko Halualani, "A Critical-Historical Genealogy of *Koko* (Blood), *'Aina* (Land), Hawaiian Identity, and Western Law and Governance," in *Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State*, ed. Alfred W. McCoy and Francisco A. Scarano, 238–247 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009).
3. This study draws extensively on the work of historians who have spearheaded the inclusion of race and gender in the study of U.S. foreign relations and military interventions: Emily Rosenberg, "'Foreign Affairs' after World War II: Connecting Sexual and International Politics," *Diplomatic History* 18 (Winter 1994): 59–70; Kristin Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998); Cynthia Enloe, *Bases, Beaches, and Bananas: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Ann Laura Stoler, "Tense and Tender Ties: The Politics of Comparison between North America and (Post) Colonial Studies," *Journal of American History* 88, no. 3 (December 2001): 829–865; Katherine H. S. Moon, *Sex among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korean Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Ji-Yeon Yuh, *Beyond the Shadow of Camptown: Korean Military Brides in America* (New York: New York University Press, 2002); Paul Kramer, "The Darkness That Enters the Home: The Politics of Prostitution during the Philippine-American War," in *Haunted by Empire: Geographies of Intimacy in North American History*, ed. Ann Stoler, 366–404 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2006); Paul

- Kramer, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, and the United States and the Philippines* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).
4. For just a few examples, see Anne Keegan, "Staying Behind: Amerasians: Echoes of a Forgotten War," *Chicago Tribune*, October 17, 1982; T. D. Allman, "Our Children of the Vietnam War," *Chicago Tribune*, September 28, 1982; Johnson, "Children of the Dust," *Time*, May 13, 2002, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,237115,00.html> (accessed January 6, 2011).
5. Jodi Kim, "An 'Orphan' with Two Mothers: Transnational and Transracial Adoption, the Cold War, and Contemporary Asian American Cultural Politics," *American Quarterly* 61, no. 4 (December 2009): 855–880; Gregory Paul Choy and Catherine Ceniza Choy, "What Lies Beneath? Reframing *Daughter from Danang*," in *Outsiders Within: Writing on Transracial Adoption*, ed. Jane Jeong Trenka, Julia Chinyere Oparah, and Sun Yung Shin, 221–231 (Cambridge, Mass.: South End Press, 2006); Fiona I. B. Ngo, "A Chameleon's Fate: Transnational Mixed-Race Vietnamese Identities," *Amerasia Journal* 31, no. 2 (2005): 51–62.
6. Toby Alice Volkman, ed., *Cultures of Transnational Adoption* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2005); Diana Marre and Laura Briggs, eds., *International Adoption: Global Inequalities and the Circulation of Children* (New York: New York University Press, 2009); Trenka, Oparah, and Shin, *Outsiders Within*; Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945–1961* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Laura Briggs, "Mother, Child, Race, Nation: The Visual Iconography of Rescue and the Politics of Transnational and Transracial Adoption," *Gender and History* 15, no. 2 (August 2003): 179–200; Lisa Cartwright, "Photographs of 'Waiting Children': The Transnational Adoption Market," *Social Text* 24, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 83–109; Karen Dubinsky, "Babies without Borders: Rescue, Kidnap, and the Symbolic Child," *Journal of Women's History* 19, no. 1 (2007): 142–150; Linda Gordon, *The Great Arizona Orphan Abduction* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001). Historians such as Christina Klein have argued that international Asian adoptions have performed diplomatic "work," illustrating an American middle-class commitment to the East. She has demonstrated how white families' adoptions of Asian children cemented hierarchies of American paternalism, while also fostering an image of U.S. antiracism. Klein, *Cold War Orientalism*, 189–190.
7. Robert G. Lee, *Orientalism: Asian Americans in Popular Culture* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999); John Dower, *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986); Christian G. Appy, *Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 103–107; Wallace Terry, *Bloods: An Oral History of the Vietnam War by Black Veterans* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1984), 5–6.
8. U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), *Vietnamese Amerasian Resettlement: Education, Employment, and Family Outcomes in the United States*, GAO/

- PEMD-94-15, March 31, 1994, 11. According to a U.S. survey comparing Vietnamese and Amerasian immigrants, all of the Vietnamese immigrants attended school through second grade, while 17 percent of the Amerasians never attended primary school. These statistics were even starker for black Amerasians. In another review, 31 percent of black Amerasians never attended school compared to 13 percent of white Amerasians. Marilyn Lacey, *In Our Father's Land: Vietnamese Amerasians in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: A Survey by the U.S. Catholic Conference Migration and Refugee Services, 1985), 35.
9. For works on the personal lives of Vietnamese Amerasians, see Steven DeBonis, *Children of the Enemy: Oral Histories of Vietnamese Amerasians and Their Mothers* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1995); Thomas Bass, *Vietnamerica: The War Comes Home* (New York: Soho Press, 1996); Jana K. Lipman, *Mixed Voices, Mixed Policy: Vietnamese Amerasians in Vietnam and the United States* (Providence, R.I.: Wayland University Press, 1997); Robert S. McKelvey, *The Dust of Life: America's Children Abandoned in Vietnam* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999); Trin Yarborough, *Amerasian Children of the Vietnam War* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005); Kien Nguyen, *The Unwanted: A Memoir* (Boston: Little Brown, 2001).
 10. Lee, *Oriental*, 180; Robert S. Chang, *Disoriented: Asian Americans, Law, and the Nation-State* (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 6; Lisa Lowe, *Immigrant Acts* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1996); Mae Ngai, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Subjects and the Making of Modern America* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004).
 11. Sucheng Chan, ed., *The Vietnamese American 1.5 Generation: Stories of War, Revolution, Flight, and New Beginnings* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006), 80–81.
 12. Judith Kumin, "Orderly Departure from Vietnam: Cold War Anomaly or Humanitarian Innovation?" *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 27 no. 1 (2008): 104–117; GAO, *The Orderly Departure Program from Vietnam* (Washington, D.C., 1990), <http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat10/141353.pdf> (accessed March 3, 2010).
 13. Nguyen Manh Hung, "Vietnamese," in *Refugees in the United States: A Reference Handbook*, ed. David W. Haines, 195–208 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985); Chan, *Vietnamese American 1.5 Generation*, 84, 95.
 14. 1965 Immigration Act (Hart-Cellar Act), H.R. 2580; Pub.L. 89–236; 79 Stat. 911, 89th Congress, October 3, 1965.
 15. The majority of the literature on the ODP and Amerasian legislation has appeared in law journals. These articles do not fit Amerasian policies into a broader framework of Asian immigration or analyze the racial or gendered "work" of the ODP. See Ernest C. Robear, "The Dust of Life: The Legal and Political Ramifications of the Continuing Vietnamese Amerasian Problem," *Dickinson Journal of International Law* 8, no. 1 (Fall 1989): 125–146; Kieu-Linh Caroline Valverde, "From Dust to Gold: The Vietnamese Amerasian Experience," in *Racially Mixed People in America*, ed. Maria P. P. Root, 144–161

- (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1992); Robin Levi, "Legacies of War: The United States' Obligation toward Amerasians," *Stanford Journal of International Law* 29 (1993): 459–502; MaryKim DeMonaco, "Disorderly Departure: An Analysis of the United States Policy toward Amerasian Immigration," *Brooklyn Journal of International Law* 15, no. 3 (1989): 641–709; and Trautfield, "America's Responsibility to Amerasian Children," 55–82.
16. Yen Le Espiritu, "The 'We-Win-Even-When-We-Lose' Syndrome: U.S. Press Coverage of the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the 'Fall of Saigon,'" *American Quarterly* (2006): 334. My work also draws on Yen Le Espiritu's argument that the United States reframed Vietnamese refugees as a "problem to be solved," and repositioned itself as the heroic rescue team at the ready. Yen le Espiritu, "Toward a Critical Refugee Study: The Vietnamese Refugee Subject in U.S. Scholarship," *Journal of Vietnamese Studies* 1, nos. 1–2 (2006): 410–433.
17. Bernard Gwertzman, "President Approves Plan to Admit 15,000 More Indo-chinese refugees," *New York Times*, July 16, 1977.
18. Steven V. Roberts, "Boat People Brave Adversity to Seek New Lives in U.S.," *New York Times*, January 2, 1978. See also Carl J. Bon Tempo, *Americans at the Gate: The United States and Refugees during the Cold War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008), 155–165.
19. "Ship to Shore," *Economist*, December 16, 1978, 32.
20. Chang, *Disoriented*, 22–26.
21. Francisco L. Rivera-Batiz, Seilig L. Sechzer, and Ira N. Gang, eds., *U.S. Immigration Policy Reform in the 1980s: A Preliminary Assessment* (New York: Praeger Press, 1991); Frank D. Bean, Barry Edmonston, and Jeffrey S. Passel, eds., *Undocumented Migration to the United States: IRCA and the Experience of the 1980s* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1990); David Simcox, ed., *U.S. Immigration in the 1980s, Reappraisal and Reform* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press and the Center for Immigration Studies, 1988); Kitty Calavita, "Gaps and Contradictions in U.S. Immigration Policy: An Analysis of Recent Reform Efforts," in *The Immigration Reader: America in a Multidisciplinary Perspective*, ed. David Jacobson, 92–110 (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1998).
22. John Scruggs to Kenneth M. Duberstein, Re: Amerasian Children-Administration Involvement and Chances for Passage, July 19, 1982, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library (RR), WHORM Subject File, IM 091626-092172. A collection of documents related to Vietnamese Amerasians was declassified collectively through a Freedom of Information Act request. A list of the declassified files is available on the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Web site, <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/textual/topics/amerasian.htm> (accessed March 3, 2010).
23. Michael D. Hoefer, "Background of U.S. Immigration Policy Reform," in Rivera-Batiz, Sechzer, and Gang, *U.S. Immigration Policy Reform*, 18–23.
24. John Scruggs to Kenneth M. Duberstein, Re: Amerasian Children-Administration Involvement and Chances for Passage, July 19, 1982, RR, WHROM Subject File, IM 091626-092172.

25. Lyn Nofziger to Edwin Meese, James Baker, Michael Deaver, and William Clark, July 8, 1982, RR, WHROM Subject File, IM 091626-092172.
26. Elliott Abrams to Michael Deaver, June 25, 1982, RR, WHROM Subject File, IM 091626-092172.
27. Congressional Record, October 1, 1982, House, H8351.
28. Robert A. McConnell to David A. Stockman, October 12, 1982, RR, WHROM Subject File, IM 105000–105499.
29. Ronald Reagan, Remarks on Signing S. 1698 into Law, October 22, 1982, Immigration of Amerasian Children, RR, WHROM Subject File, MA 020 189381.
30. “Proposed Signing Statement,” RR, WHROM Subject File, IM 105000–105499.
31. “Proposed Signing Statement,” RR, WHROM Subject File, IM 105000–105499.
32. Along with Vietnamese Amerasians, the 1982 legislation included Amerasians from Korea, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand. The Philippines and Japan, locations of large U.S. military bases, were conspicuously absent from this legislation.
33. 1982 Amerasian Immigration Act (an amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act to provide preferential treatment in the admission of certain children of United States citizens), S. 1698; Pub.L. 97-359; 96 Stat. 1716, 97th Congress, October 22, 1982.
34. Melinda Beck, “Where Is My Father?” *Newsweek*, April 15, 1985, 57; Valverde, “From Dust to Gold”; State Department, Legislative Referral Memorandum, October 14, 1987, IM 55040.
35. Bass, *Vietnamerica*, 93.
36. Valverde, “From Dust to Gold,” 150–153; Robear, “Dust of Life,” 132–134. Both of these articles utilize athletic analogies, arguing that the U.S. and Vietnamese governments were “playing games” with Vietnamese Amerasians lives.
37. “*Newsday* Community Affairs: High School of the Year,” *Newsday*, May 29, 1987, 39; Irene Virag, “For Minh in Bangkok, Comfort and Crying,” *Newsday*, June 2, 1987, 29; Paul Marinaccio, “Students Trying to Help a Boy Half a World Away,” *Newsday*, November 9, 1986, 2; Levi, “Legacies of War,” 487–488.
38. Irene Virag, “The Life and Times of Le Van Minh: One Boy’s Journey from the Dusty Streets of Ho Chi Minh City,” *Newsday*, June 22, 1987, 6.
39. Alan Eysen, “Mrazek’s Good Deed Has Political Pulse,” *Newsday*, June 5, 1987, 22.
40. Irene Virag, “Mrazek Leaves Today on a Mission of Mercy,” *Newsday*, May 26, 1987, 23; Ford Fessenden, “Exit Visa for Amerasian,” *Newsday*, April 25, 1987, 2.
41. John Bolton, Assistant Attorney General, to Hon. Peter W. Rodino, Committee on the Judiciary, October 30, 1987—Legislative Referral Memorandum, RR, WHROM Subject File, IM 524317.

42. J. Edward Fox, Department of State Draft Report on HR 3171, Homecoming Act, October 14, 1987, RR, WHROM Subject File, IM 55040.
43. Although finding and recovering POWs and MIAs remained U.S. politicians' central preoccupation, many came to recognize that there were no men or American bodies to return to the United States. H. Bruce Franklin argues that the political creation of the MIA "myth" served the political function of precluding U.S. diplomatic relations with Vietnam. H. Bruce Franklin, *MIA or Mythmaking in America* (Brooklyn, N.Y.: Lawrence Hill Books, 1992).
44. Congressional Review, June 17, 1987, 16410.
45. Congressional Record, July 28, 1987, 21206-21207.
46. For leading cultural critics and feminist analysis of these films, see Franklin, *MIA or Mythmaking*, 133; Marita Sturken, *Tangled Memories: The Vietnam War, the AIDS Epidemic, and the Politics of Remembering* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 107-112; Susan Jeffords, *The Remasculinization of America Gender and the Vietnam War* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989); Lynda Boose, "Techno-Muscularity and the 'Boy Eternal': From the Quagmire to the Gulf," in *Cultures of United States Imperialism*, ed. Amy Kaplan and Donald Pease, 588-590 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1993).
47. Walter Goodman, "Missing in Action Part 3," *New York Times*, January 22, 1988.
48. Joseph Cerquone, "War 'Vets' Who Are Not Yet Home," *Chicago Tribune*, May 26, 1986.
49. Greg Kane, letter to the editor, "Cut Red Tape for Amerasians," *Newsday*, December 24, 1986, 49.
50. Richard F. Lane, letter to the editor, "Where Did the Fathers Go?" *Newsday*, July 2, 1987, 93.
51. Ronald J. Young, letter to the editor, *Newsday*, September 11, 1987, 89.
52. Franklin, *MIA or Mythmaking*, 75.
53. Levi, "Legacies of War," 490.
54. "Congressmen Claim Accord," 8.
55. Jean Davidson, "Bill Kurtis Revisits Vietnam, Plight of Amerasians," *Chicago Tribune*, February 11, 1994.
56. GAO, "Report on Amerasian Resettlement to Representative Robert J. Mrazek and Representative Thomas J. Ridge," November 16, 1992 (Washington, D.C.: GAO/PEMD-93-10R) 4; Interaction American Council for Voluntary International Action, "Amerasian Resettlement Program Final Report," January 14, 1994, 3.
57. George Anthony Pepper, *If They Don't Bring Their Women Here: Chinese Female Immigration before Exclusion* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999); Erika Lee, *At America's Gates: Chinese Immigration during the Exclusion Era, 1882-1943* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 23-30, 41, 94; Eithne Luibhéid, *Entry Denied: Controlling Sexuality at the Border* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 31-54.

58. Lee, *At America's Gate*, 92–100.
59. David Eng, "Transnational Adoptions and Queer Diasporas," *Social Text* 21, no. 3 (Fall 2003): 1–37; Leti Volpp, "Divesting Citizenship: On Asian American History and the Loss of Citizenship through Marriage," *UCLA L. Rev.* 53 (December 2005): 405–483; Naoko Shibusawa, *America's Geisha Ally: Reimagining the Japanese Enemy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 47–50; Yuh, *Beyond the Shadow of Camptown*.
60. The U.S. production was controversial largely because Actors' Equity protested the casting of Jonathan Pryce, a white British actor, in the role of the Eurasian engineer. Given the racial politics of the musical production and the prominence of Amerasians to the storyline, this debate over who was and who was not capable of portraying a mixed-race character took on both particular emotional debate and irony. For a sampling of commentary over the casting debate, see Dick Cavett, "My Union, Actors' Inequity," *New York Times*, August 10, 1990; Paul Winfield, "Equity Was Right the First Time," *New York Times*, August 18, 1990; "Two Stage Triumphs," *New York Times*, August 18, 1990; Ellen Holly and Shirley Sun, "Why the Furor over 'Miss Saigon' Won't Fade," *New York Times*, August 26, 1990.
61. "Inspirations," Miss Saigon Australia, <http://www.miss-saigonaustralia.com.au/Inspirations.aspx> (accessed October 22, 2008).
62. U.S. Public Law 97-359, 97th Congress, October 22, 1982.
63. Congressional Record, October 1, 1982, House, H8352.
64. Senate Testimony of Walter Reed Martindale III, Hearing on S. 1698, June 21, 1982.
65. The most egregious case was Operation Babylift. In 1975, the United States engineered an "adoption" operation to rescue Vietnamese children from the impending North Vietnamese occupation. Approximately half of these children were Amerasians. In the initial rescue flight, the U.S. jet crashed, killing more than 200 children and adults. See Lacy Fosburgh, "First Orphans Arrive to Begin a New Life," *New York Times*, April 4, 1975; Fox Butterfield, "Huge Air Force Craft Was Flying Children to Refuge in U.S.," *New York Times*, April 5, 1975; "Ford Meets Jet Flying Children Out of Vietnam," *New York Times*, April 6, 1975; Douglas Kneeland, "Saigon Is Said to Demand Refugee Children Return," *New York Times*, May 10, 1975.
66. DeBonis, *Children of the Enemy*, 79.
67. Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases*; see also Sue Sun, "Where the Girls Are: The Management of Venereal Disease by United States Military Forces in Vietnam," *Literature and Medicine* 23, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 66–87.
68. DeBonis, *Children of the Enemy*, 228.
69. Colin Campbell, "Doubts Expressed on Amerasian Law," *New York Times*, December 22, 1982.
70. Robear "Dust of Life," 132.
71. Lacey, "In Our Fathers' Land," 19.
72. DeMonaco, "Disorderly Departure," 680.

73. Valverde, "From Dust to Gold," 144.
74. GAO, "Report on Amerasian Resettlement," 5–6.
75. William Branigin, "Vietnamese Try to Buy American Dream," *Washington Post*, February 19, 1993; Johnson, "Children of the Dust"; DeBonis, *Children of the Enemy*; U.S. Orderly Departure Program, "Important Information for Amerasians," American Family Claims, March 1992.
76. Mae M. Ngai, "Legacies of Exclusion: Illegal Chinese Immigration during the Cold War Years," *Journal of American Ethnic History* 18, no. 1 (Fall 1998): 3–35; Madeline Y. Hsu, *Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of Home: Transnationalism and Migration Between the United States and South China, 1882–1943* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000), 74–89.
77. Branigin, "Vietnamese Try to Buy American Dream."
78. Bass, *Vietnamerica*, 55.
79. Judith Cummings, "San Diego Father to Greet Family of 6," *New York Times*, September 30, 1982; Colin Campbell, "24 Children of American Fathers, Happy but Tearful, Leave Vietnam," *New York Times*, October 8, 1982.
80. Beck, "'Where Is My Father?'"
81. Erin Marcus, "In America, Amerasian Odyssey: Few Find Fathers Who Left Them Behind in Vietnam," *Washington Post*, March 8, 1992.
82. For an analysis of the politics of mixed-race identities and racial formations in the United States, see David Palumbo-Liu, *Asian/American Historical Crossings of a Racial Frontier* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999), 81–115; Lauren Berlant, "The Face of America and the State of Emergency," in *The Queen of America Goes to Washington City: Essays on Sex and Citizenship* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997), 175–220. Berlant notes the ways in which the utopian representation of a mixed-race America emerged in the early 1990s, culminating in *Time* magazine's special 1993 issue featuring a computer-generated multiracial female cyborg. She argues that this image stood in contrast to cultural fears of conflict and immigrants of color, and pacified these anxieties in this female icon that presumed a homogenized and legible American culture.
83. Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Testimony on S. 1698 by Stewart McKinney, June 21, 1982.
84. Edward A. Olsen, "Rescuing Amerasians: A Moral Imperative," *Christian Science Monitor*, November 24, 1982.
85. Kurtis, "Plight of the Children Abandoned in Vietnam."
86. Beck, "'Where Is My Father?'" ; Kathleen Brady, "The Women We Abandoned," *Parade*, February 19, 1989, 4–6.
87. For a range of photo essays, see Debonis, *Children of the Enemy*; Ted Engelmann, "Who Are Our Fathers?" *Journal of American History* 94, no. 1 (June 2007): 163–171; and online sources such as <http://fatherfounded.org/> (accessed November 21, 2008).
88. Brady, "Women We Abandoned."

89. Paul Quinn-Judge, "Amerasian Children's Long Journey to America," *Christian Science Monitor*, December 2, 1982.
90. William Branigin, "Amerasians Heading for U.S.," *Washington Post*, March 24, 1983.
91. Kathleen Hendrix, "Andrews Seeks Help for the Orphans of S.E. Asia," *Los Angeles Times*, September 22, 1982. Andrews, of course, was not American, but British. In this account, Vietnamese Amerasians also saw all white visitors as Americans.
92. *Los Angeles Times*, February 24, 1985.
93. Congressional Record, October 1, 1982, House, H8352.
94. Senate Testimony of Walter Reed Martindale III, Hearing on S.1698, June 21, 1982.
95. Lacey, "In Our Fathers' Land," 91; David Gonzalez, "For Afro-Amerasians, Tangled Emotions," *New York Times*, November 16, 1992.
96. See James Westheider, *Fighting on Two Fronts: African Americans and the Vietnam War* (New York: New York University Press, 1999); and Wallace Terry, *Bloods: Black Veterans of the Vietnam War, an Oral History* (New York: Presidio Press, 1985).
97. Gonzalez, "For Afro-Amerasians, Tangled Emotions."
98. GAO, *Vietnamese Amerasian Resettlement*, 11.
99. DeBonis, *Children of the Enemy*, 85.
100. Colin Powell (prepared by Richard Childress) to Vice President and Chief of Staff, March 29, 1988, re: Amerasian Children, RR, WHROM Subject File, IM 541476.
101. Colin Powell (prepared by Richard Childress) to Vice President and Chief of Staff, April 19, 1988, re: Amerasian Children, RR, WHROM Subject File, IM 541476.
102. Brady, "Woman We Abandoned," 6.
103. Branigin, "Vietnamese Try to Buy American Dream."
104. Bass, *Vietnamerica*, 58.